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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine if the presence of stabilization 
funds helps Algeria –as an oil rich economy- to stabilize their 
expenditures and address the pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy, 
using Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model for the period 
1984-2016. Alike  other oil countries, government spending in Algeria 
is  considered  to be strongly pro-cyclical .The results show that the 
establishment of stabilization fund in Algeria has not contributed to 
reduce the government spending pro-cyclicality. This  is due to  the 
absence of a  rule that limits the withdrawals from the fund to finance 
budget deficit.  
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LES FONDS DE STABILISATION ET LA POLITIQUE 
BUDGETAIRE: CAS DE L’ALGERIE 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'objectif de cet article est d'examiner si la présence de fonds de 
stabilisation aide l'Algérie - en tant qu'économie riche en pétrole - à 
stabiliser ses dépenses et à reduire le comportement procyclique de la 
politique budgétaire. Un modèle autorégressif à retards échelonnés 
ARDL est utilisé durant la période 1984-2016.Les résultats montrent 
que la création d'un fond de stabilisation en Algérie n'a pas contribué 
à réduire la procyclicalité des dépenses publiques. Cela s'explique en 
partie par l'absence de règle limitant les retraits du fonds pour 
financer Le budget de l'État. 
MOTS CLÉS :  
Fonds de stabilization, procyclicalité, modèle  ARDL, 
L'environnement institutionnel, Algerie. 
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 الجزائر حالة دراسة: المالية السياسة و اإليرادات ضبط صناديق
 ملخص
 ساعد اإليرادات ضبط صندوق وجدود كان إذا ما معرفة إىل املقال ىذا يهدف
 مشكلة من احلد يف ساىم و العامة نفقاهتا تثبيت على - باملوارد غين كبلد- اجلزائر
 الذايت االحندار منوذج نستخدم سوف اإلشكالية ىذه ملعاجلة و.املالية السياسة دورية
 نتائج بينت. 6142 حىت 4891 من الفًتة خالل ARDL املوزعة الزمنية للفجوات
 أن تبني لككذ. شديد بدورية تتميز اجلزائر يف العام اإلنفاق سياسة أن التطبيقية الدراسة
 اجلزائر، يف املالية السياسة دورية من التقليل يف يساىم مل اإليرادات لضبط صندوق إنشاء
 قواعد غياب ىو العام اإلنفاق ضبط يف الصندوق ىذا فشل أسباب أىم بني من لعل و
 .  العامة امليزانية لتمويل منو تسحب اليت املبالغ من حتد واضحة
 : مفتاحية كلمات
 الذايت االحندار منوذج املؤسسية، البيئة املالية، السياسة دورية اإليرادات، ضبط صناديق
 .اجلزائر املوزعة، الزمنية للفجوات













Most recent studies have shown that developing countries with 
more natural resources tend to have lower rates of growth and 
underperforms economically and socially compared to  poor resource  
countries. This puzzling phenomenon became known as the Natural 
Resource Curse or the paradox of abundance. One increasingly 
popular option for dealing with the resource curse is the natural 
resource funds or stabilization funds.  
Since 2000, approximately 30 funds have been created. Many oil 
rich countries have established Natural Resource Funds , in which a 
portion of government revenues from oil and gas exportations is 
deposited,‚usually known as  Stabilization Funds‚, and to save part 
of the oil revenues for future generations ,‚usually known as Savings 
Funds or future generations funds‛, or both (Davis et al., 2001) . 
In general the primary objective of stabilization funds , especially 
in oil rich economies is to insulate the budget and the economy 
against resource prices volatility and governments’ dependence on 
revenues from resources. Also, these funds can be used to stabilize 
capital inflows to avoid Dutch Disease, to protect resource revenues 
from corruption and mismanagement, and to save some revenues for 
future generations. 
As in  many rich resource  countries, Algeria decided to set up a 
stabilization fund (Revenue Regulation Fund) to aid the sustainable 
management of its oil and gas revenues, stabilize government 
expenditures, and insulates its economy from the effects of oil prices 
volatility. 
The oil stabilization fund of Algeria was established in 2000, based 
on a fiscal rule where oil revenue in excess of budgeted price is 
allocated into the fund. Since 2006, the rules governing the fund 
allowed for direct financing of the budget deficit by the fund’s 
resources, when oil prices fall. 
Over the last decade, over-spending by the government and highly 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy were the major challenges facing Algeria’s oil 
fund main objective, which is smoothing and stabilizing public 
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expenditures. The objective of this paper is to investigate 
quantitatively and qualitatively whether the establishment of a 
stabilization fund has contributed in smoothing Algeria’s government 
expenditures throughout the 15 years of RRF’s existence. More 
specifically, this paper aims to answer the following question: does 
the presence of a stabilization fund (Revenue Regulation Fund) help 
Algeria’s governments to stabilize their expenditures and address the 
pro-cyclical behaviour of government expenditures? 
To our knowledge there is a clear gap in the research literature in  
regard to the role of the oil fund in stabilizing government 
expenditures in Algeria. This study is an attempt to fill the gap 
concerning this issue. This study is divided into five sections in 
addition to an introduction. Section two deals with  the literature 
review on the effect of oil revenue funds on the stabilization of 
government expenditure. Section three presents some stylised facts 
about the performance of Algeria’s stabilization funds (Revenue 
Regulation Fund) since 2000. Section four describes the empirical 
methodology. Section five presents the estimation results. Finally, 
Section six provides some concluding comments. 
1- LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on the effect of oil revenue funds on the 
stabilization of government expenditure is rather mixed. In a 
descriptive analysis of commodity-based stabilization and savings 
funds currently in place in Norway, Chile, Alaska, Venezuela, Kuwait, 
and Oman, Fasano (2000) finds that savings funds in countries like 
Kuwait, Norway, and the state of Alaska have contributed to enhance  
the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making government expenditures 
less driven by revenue volatility, whereas, in other countries 
(Venezuela and Oman) the experience with stabilization funds have 
been less successful . Nevertheless, the author report that the success 
of an oil revenue stabilization fund could be attributed as much as to 
fiscal discipline as to the funds management. 
Davis et al. (2001) test the existence of oil revenue funds on the 
stabilization of government expenditure in a sample of 12 countries 
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producing non-renewable resources, including only five that had funds 
(Chile , Kuwait, Norway, Oman , Papua New Guinea , Algeria, Bahrain, 
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, UAE, UK, and Venezuela) . The main question 
they ask is whether such funds can smooth government expenditure, 
cutting the link between expenditure and oil (resource) revenues?  
They find that in countries without stabilization funds resource 
export earnings are positively correlated with government 
expenditure. But also they find that in some countries, the existence of 
an oil fund does not affect this positive relation between spending and 
resource export receipts. Additionally , their evidence show that , in 
other countries with a fund government expenditure did not follow 
resource revenues , but they report that this was the case  both before 
and after the establishment of the fund . Davis et al. (2001) concluded 
‚The creation of a fund did not have any impact on the relationship between 
oil and other natural resource export earnings and government expenditure‚. 
These authors suggest that countries with more prudent expenditure 
policies tend to establish stabilization fund, rather than the 
establishment of fund stabilizing the  government expenditure. In fact, 
the authors established that oil or resource funds in most cases have 
adverse impact on stabilizing budgetary expenditure and revenue. 
Crain and Devlin (2003) examine the effect of natural resource 
funds on the volatility of government expenditures, for 71 countries 
for the period 1970-2000. Among their conclusions, they find that 
stabilization funds increase volatility of government expenditures 
particularly in oil exporting countries. However, the results also show 
that in countries like Norway and Chile the establishment of funds 
reduced the expenditure volatility.  
Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) test whether oil revenue funds help to 
reduce macroeconomic volatility. Using data over the period 1980-
2003 from 15 oil exporting countries with and without funds, the 
authors find that oil funds are associated with reduced volatility of 
broad money and prices and lower inflation. Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) 
conclude that oil revenue funds stabilize money and prices. They note 
that their results contradict the view that oil funds may simply be 
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‚Veils‛, and that in and themselves, they do not affect economic 
performance.   
Ossowski et al. (2008) examine the role of special fiscal institutions 
(Special Fiscal Institutions  include fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility 
legislation, oil funds, and the use of budgetary oil prices) in fiscal 
management, using a panel data of 32 oil rich countries with and 
without stabilization fund in place (or SFI). The authors find that 
special fiscal institutions have no significant impact on expenditure 
growth or in reducing the correlation between expenditures and oil 
revenue. Additionally, the study finds that countries with broader 
governance institutions (e.g.,lower indices of corruption , higher 
governance effectiveness) have lower correlations between 
government expenditures and oil revenue .Ossowski et al. (2008) note 
that higher institutional quality (governance stability , democratic 
accountability , rule of law, and corruption) are crucial for improving 
public financial management , while, special fiscal institutions 
(including oil funds) are  ‚second best ‚ mechanism to protect oil 
resources and use them effectively . These authors conclude that 
successful special fiscal institutions require strong political and 
institutional framework. 
Bagattini (2011) assesses the effectiveness of the stabilization and 
savings funds in 12 resource dependent countries over the period of 
1992 – 2007, by creating an indicator of sustainable fiscal performance  
that measures the success of stabilization funds , and which is defined 
by its impact along three different dimensions : fiscal revenues , fiscal 
expenditures  and savings. The study finds that the presence of 
stabilization funds have a positive impact on the reduction of public 
debt and on a reduction of government expenditures. The estimations 
results also show that the political variables (policy2, political 
stability, rule of law and civil liberties) are important for the success of 
stabilization funds.    
Wagner and Elder (2005) conduct an empirical analysis studying 
the relationship between state expenditure volatility and the existence 
of stabilization funds for the United States of America over the period 
from 1969 to 1999. The authors find that the ability for natural 
resource funds to stabilize state expenditures depend essentially on 
Les Cahiers du Cread, vol. 34 -  n° 3 - 2018 
38 
 
the structure of the deposit and withdrawal rules governing the fund. 
The results of the study show that states with rule-bound stabilization 
funds experience significantly less expenditures volatility from 
utilizing a budget stabilization fund.  
In the most recent study of the issue, Sugawara (2014) explores 
whether the presence of stabilization funds created by government in 
resource rich countries are effective in reducing their expenditures 
volatility. Using a data of 68 countries over the period of 1988-2012, 
Sagawara (2014) finds that the existence of stabilization funds 
contribute to smoothing government expenditures. The results of the 
econometric analysis shows that volatility of government spending in 
countries with stabilization funds is 13 percent lower than in countries 
without such funds . However, the results also suggest that strong 
institutional framework and fiscal rules are important factors in 
reducing the volatility of government expenditure. 
In fact, almost all these studies conducted on this matter, indicate 
that the effectiveness of natural resource funds in smoothing 
government expenditures, was only in countries with good 
governance institutions and sound public financial management. 
2- OIL STABILIZATION FUND OF ALGERIA 
To address the problems arising from the oil curse , such as the 
appreciation of national currencies (or the so-called Dutch Disease), 
the volatility of revenues , the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy , 
corruption and misuse of newfound wealth , many oil exporting 
countries have set up oil stabilization funds over the past decade . 
Algeria is set to joint other oil rich countries such as Botswana, Chile 
and Norway in establishing these stabilization funds to help ensure 
proper management of oil revenues and stabilize government 
expenditure. This section  presents the experiences of Algeria with 
stabilization funds.  
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2.1- Algeria’s revenue regulation fund: an overview 
Algeria’s Revenue Regulation fund: The revenue regulation fund 
(Fond de Régulation des Recettes)   of Algeria was established in 2000, 
and administered by the finance ministry and the central bank .The 
fund accumulates part of the hydrocarbon revenue. The mission of the 
fund is to shield government expenditures from fluctuations in oil 
revenues, as well as to make advance payments on external debt 
principal. Henceforth, the oil fund of Algeria does not have 
intergenerational transfer purposes, it is stabilization rather than a 
saving fund. The rules of the fund provide that oil revenues above the 
budget benchmark oil price goes to the fund, while the fund’s resources 
can be used to amortize debt and finance budget deficit when the price 
of oil drops below the reference value. Algeria’s Revenue Regulation 
fund is a subaccount of the government at the Bank of Algeria (central 
bank). Consequently, it lacks governance arrangements and investment 
goals of  sovereign wealth funds (IMF, 2009). 
The revenue regulation fund first rules were passed on February 
06, 2002. The stated objective of the fund was to reconstitute foreign 
exchange reserves depleted in 1998-99 during a period of low oil 
revenues .Although this goal has remained unchanged , the rules 
governing the fund have  been changed twice  , in 2004 , and again in 
November 2006.   The 2004 budget law provides that the fund’s 
resources are as follows: Oil revenue recorded in excess of budget law 
projections (which are based on prudent price per barrel forecasts) is 
allocated to the hydrocarbon stabilization fund. Also, according to the 
this budget law, the amounts accumulated in the fund can only be 
used to: i) Offset the shortfalls resulting from oil tax revenue below 
budget law projections; ii) Make advanced payments on external debt 
principal . In November 2006, the revenue regulation fund law was 
modified. As a result , the rules in which stabilization fund could only 
be used to repay public debt was amended by the budget 
complementary law of 2006 , which allowed for direct financing of the 
budget deficit by the fund’s resources , unless the balance of  the fund 
drops below 740 Billions of DA (10 USD billions).  
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2.1.1. Oil prices fluctuations and revenue regulation fund 
   Algeria’s oil stabilization resources are highly correlated with 
world oil prices movements during the period from 2000 to 2015, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. As the rapid upsurge in oil prices during the 
period from 2000-2013, the revenue regulation fund accumulated 
more than 70 billion dollars by the end of 2013, equivalent to 31.6 
percent of GDP. However, since the oil price fall has started  in the 
first half of 2014, savings in the oil stabilization fund decreased 
slightly for the first time since the fund was created representing less 
than 21 percent of GDP in the end of 2015, and it is expected to decline 
to less than 15.2 percent of GDP in 2016 (IMF, 2014), reflecting the 
government’s withdrawals to finance budget deficits.  
Figure 1: Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund (in USD billions) 
 
Source: The data on Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund value Assets are available at 
Algeria’s Ministry of Finance; Converted to USD, Own calculations. The data on oil 
price are available at US Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
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2.1.2. The contribution of the fund in the repayment of the external 
debt 
Since its creation in 2000, authorities have used part of the 
accumulated resources housed in the stabilization fund to make 
prepayments of the country’s external debt .Thanks to high 
hydrocarbons export revenues, and the large savings accumulated in 
the oil stabilization fund, the Algerian authorities decided in 2004 to 
repay official external debt earlier than had been scheduled, and limit 
non-concessional borrowing. Between 2004 and the earlier of May 
2006, Algeria refunded about $14 billion in external debt ahead of 
schedule. In 2005, Algeria repaid $3.3 billion to multilateral creditors, 
including the international monetary fund.  In March 2005, Algeria 
obtained cancellation of $4.73 billion debt to Russia in exchange for 
Algeria agreeing to import an equivalent amount of Russian goods 
and services (IMF, 2008). By the end of 200, Algeria prepaid a total of 
$8.5 billion in total debt to the Paris and London club, and $2 billion to 
multilateral creditors. As a result, Algeria external debt stock declined 
from $23.4 billion at the end of 2003 (about 34 percent of GDP) to less 
than $5,6 billion at the end of 2006 , or 4.8 percent of GDP (Figure 2) . 
Figure 2:  External Debt, 2000-15 
 
Source: The data on Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund savings are available at Algeria’s 
Ministry of Finance; Converted to USD, Own calculations. The data on Gross external debt and 
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2.1.3. The role of the RRF in financing the budget deficit  
The budget complementary law of 2006 allowed the use of fiscal 
savings accumulated in the oil fund for financing needs created by 
fiscal deficits. Since that withdrawals from the stabilization fund to 
finance budget deficits have continued their upward movement, 
particularly during the last five years, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: RRF’s resources used to finance the budget deficit  
 
Source: Algeria’s Ministry of Finance. 
As a result of higher spending and the sharp decline in oil prices 
particularly over the last two years, Algeria’s fiscal deficit has grown 
significantly. From 1.2 percent of GDP in 2011 to 4.0 percent in 2012, 
and to 16 percent of GDP in 2015. Consequently, the withdrawals 
from the Revenue Regulation Fund (RRF) to finance the budget deficit 
have become more important, and started getting more and more 
frequent. With a tendency of higher public spending and lower fiscal 
revenue , the RRF balance will continue to decline in absolute terms 
and as a share of GDP (from 36.6 percent to 16.2 percent of GDP 
between 2012 and 2015). Taking these two trends together, the balance 
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2.2- Limits of Algeria’s revenue regulation fund  
2.2.1. Shortcomings of the fund’s resources  
The future of Algeria’s RRF depends essentially on the future 
evolution of its expenditures and resources, given uncertainties 
regarding Algeria’s resources horizon and future oil prices.  The 
uncertainty about the future path of oil prices:   Since 2008, Algeria’s 
budget laws have  been based on an budgeted oil price of $37  per 
barrel .However ,  the fiscal breakeven oil price (the fiscal breakeven 
oil price is the minimum price per barrel that the country needs in 
order to balance its budget) has increased from $95.5 per barrel in 
2008 to $125 per barrel in 2012 , to as higher as $130 per barrel in 
2014,which is the highest breakeven oil prices in the region among oil 
exporters (Figure 4).  
The real problem facing Algeria’s stabilization fund resource, lies 
in the substantial gap between anticipated public expenditure by the 
budget laws on the basis of a reference oil price of $37 per barrel and 
the real spending, which implies a higher  fiscal breakeven oil price. 
The budget benchmark oil price of $37 per barrel adopted by the 
government has not achieved fiscal balance , and deepens  budget 
deficit over the years , since , the withdrawals from the fund to 
finance these deficits have  increased substantially over years . On the 
other hand , since 2012 , the breakeven oil price has exceeded  the 
average annual OPEC crude oil price , leading to significant decrease 
of the fund’s resources, and to  unsustainable budget deficits (Figure 
5).Fiscal savings accumulated in the RRF  declined in 2013 , 2014 , and 
2015 , a further decline is anticipated in 2016. 
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Figure 4: Algeria: Budgeted, Breakeven and annual average oil price (US$ 
per barrel) 
 
Source: IMF (2015) , Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia,  
May 2015, Washington , International Monetary Fund . 
Figure 5: Algeria: Budget Balance 
 
Source: Algeria’s Ministry of Finance. 
37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
50 















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017














































































Budget Balance (billions of Algerian Dinars)
Value of assets (Billions of Algerian Dinars)
Les Cahiers du Cread, vol. 34 -  n° 3 - 2018 
45 
2.2.2. The uncertainties surrounding Algeria’s oil production and 
exports  
The other key challenges for Algeria’s RRF stem from the heavy 
reliance of its wealth on an exhaustible source of revenues and a large 
exposure to fluctuations in international hydrocarbon prices. While oil 
production has declined since 2006, domestic hydrocarbon 
consumption has increased, consequently hydrocarbon exports 
contracted sharply (Figure 6).The trend of weak hydrocarbon exports 
together with declining prices will constrain hydrocarbon revenue, 
and weighs on fund’s annual revenue. 
Figure 6: Algeria, Hydrocarbon production, consumption and exports 
 
Source : U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) , International Energy 
Statistics Database . 
2.2.3. Limited role of the RRF in smoothing government expenditures  
In Algeria, for instance, procedures for making withdrawals are 
unclear, and spending decisions are not rule-based (Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2013). The lack of a withdrawal rule has led to discretionary 
withdrawals that have enabled the Algerian government to increase 
spending when oil prices are high and to cuts when oil prices have 
declined. In Algeria , since the oil price fall starting in the first half of 
2014 , savings in the oil stabilization fund has declined by around 5% 
since the fund was created , and it is expected to fall by a further 16% 
in 2015(IMF, 2014) reflecting the government’s withdrawals to finance 
budget deficits . Also, the declining oil price will likely see Algeria use 
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from arising. Without doing so , the government will be unable to 
cover its  public spending ,because , in Algeria government spending 
has been usually driven by revenue availability even after the 
stabilization fund was established.  
2.2.4. Shortcomings of Algeria’s RRF Transparency  
Oil stabilization funds are set up by government to protect and 
stabilize the government’s budget and overall economy from excess 
oil revenues volatility. In order to achieve this goal stabilization funds 
should be governed by strong institutions that ensure a high level of 
transparency in the use of funds resources. To assess the level of 
transparency of resource funds three indexes are often used: 
Linaburg-Maduell Index, Truman Sovereign Wealth fund’s 
Scoreboard, and the Revenue Watch Institute’s 2013 Resource 
Governance Index.    
Linaburg-Maduell Index was developed in 2008 by the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, and scores SWF’s on ten principles. The index 
ranges from one to ten, where one is the lowest level of transparency 
and ten is the highest . As for  the end of 2014 Linaburg and Maduel 
rated 52 SWF’s (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2014). The Truman 
scoreboard for SWFs was first created by Truman in 2007, and was 
further developed in Bagnall and Truman (2013). The scoreboard 
covers four area of evaluation, which are: structure of the funds, 
governance of the funds, transparency and accountability, and 
behaviour. The scoreboard ranges from 1 to 100. The higher the rating, 
the higher is the transparency level. 
The 2013 Resource Governance Index (RGI) of the Revenue Watch 
Institute measures the degree of natural resource transparency in 58 
countries. The index provides information on Natural Resource Funds 
as a special mechanisms used to govern oil, gas and minerals, and 
scores and ranks countries’ natural resource funds. The governance 
Natural Resource funds index ranges between 0 which is the lowest 
level of transparency, and 100 which is the highest  (Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2013). 
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Table 1: Truman scoreboard 2012, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index , 
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*Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index 
** Freedom in the World Country Ratings 2014 
 Table 1  presents  the results of the Truman scoreboard 2012, the 
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, and the 2013 Resource 
Governance Index for the five oil stabilization funds in Algeria, 
Venezuela ,and Norway along with the transparency international 
corruption perception index , and the political freedom index. 
According to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index neither 
Algeria’s nor Venezuela’s funds fulfil the minimum score of 8 set by 
the SWFI in order to claim adequate level of transparency. Funds in 
Algeria and Venezuela do not fulfil even half of the transparency 
requirement. On 2012 SWF scoreboard , the average for our sample is 
26.5 out of 100.According to the Resource Governance Index Algeria’s 
fund exist in the bottom -20 group . 
From this analysis it can be observed that the overall level of 
transparency of Algeria’s fund is very low. In other words, the trends 
in our findings both for transparency of the fund and corruption and 
political freedom at the national level are similar. In fact the lack of 
transparency of these funds can be attributed to a low level of 
democracy and governance in these countries in general.  
However, according to the three indexes of transparency, the fund 
of Norway ranks among the highest in governance, transparency and 
accountability .Indeed the Norway’s Government Pension Fund is 
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suggested by many as a prime example to follow .In other words, in 
the case of Norway, there is a direct correlation between the level of 
democracy and transparency of the country and the level of 
transparency of its fund. As Norway’s Minister of finance Kristin 
Halvorsen emphasized, ‘Our transparency is very connected to the 
transparency of Norwegian society. It is a part of our tradition that 
other countries do not have (Gawdat Bahgat, 2010). 
4- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1- Model and data 
This section explores the effect of stabilization funds (more 
precisely oil stabilization funds) on the government spending in 
Algeria over the period from 1984 to 2016. Based on the theoretical 















REXPEND represents real total general government expenditure, 
used as dependent variable. 
RGDP : is the real gross domestic product , the relationship 
between government expenditure and output (real GDP) is expected 
to be positive due to the phenomenon of pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policies in most of oil exporting countries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004;Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Alesina, 
Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; Ilzetski and Vegh, 2008). 
TOT: index of the country’s terms of trade. The terms of trade – the 
relative price of exports to imports -is an important variable for an oil 
exporting countries like Algeria, because in these countries, the main 
driver of the terms of trade is the oil price, thus, including TOT 
provides a control for oil prices shocks to the economy. Due the 
volatility and uncertainty of oil prices, many oil rich economies have 
found it difficult to smooth government expenditure, which has 
sometimes caused fiscal policy pro-cyclicality. 
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The cyclicality of fiscal policy is determined by looking at the sign 
and the size of 1 coefficient, which measures the elasticity of 
government spending with respect to real output.  If 1  <0 , fiscal 
policy is countercyclical; if 1  =0 ,  fiscal policy  is acyclical; and if 
1  >0 , fiscal policy is pro-cyclical. An estimated 11  implies a 
more-than-proportionate response of the fiscal variable to output 
fluctuations.  
 SF*RGDP:  stands for the interaction between stabilization funds 
assets and real GDP. It is expected that the establishment of 
stabilization funds in resource rich countries help stabilize 
expenditure levels, and insulate it from the volatility of oil revenue 
(IMF, 2008), therefor, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
expected to be negative. 
Our basic model includes additional variables, especially financing 
constraints variables and political and institutional factors in order to 
investigate the interaction of these variables with fiscal cyclicality in 
Algeria. 
Institutional quality variable is proxy by political risk index 
(ICRGPOL) taken from the dataset constructed by Political Risk 
Services (International Country Risk Guide governance indicators, 
2013) .According to ICRG’s definition‛ the aim of political risk index 
is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the 
countries‛. The political risk rating comprises 12 variables covering 
both political and social attributes (Government stability, 
Socioeconomic conditions, Investment profile, Internal conflict, 
External conflict, Corruption, Military in politics, Religious tensions, 
Law and order, Ethnic tensions, Democratic accountability, 
Bureaucracy quality) .The ICRG political risk  score ranges from 0.00% 
to 100% , with higher values indicating low risk, and lower score 
means higher risk .Countries with stronger political institutions are 
more likely to have less volatile fiscal policy , and as a result , more 
stable government expenditure (Sugawara , 2014).  
For credit constraints , two variables are used : total (domestic and 
external) gross central government debt as a share of GDP (GDEBT) as 
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a measure for the domestic and external financing from Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s  (2010) data on external debts ; Following Gavin and Perotti 
(1997), we consider  domestic credit to private sector expressed as 
percentage of GDP (CREDIT) as a measure of the degree of 
development of a financial system , it is expected that more developed 
financial systems enable countries to run anti-cyclical fiscal policy  .  
The macroeconomic and fiscal variables consist  of annual data 
during the period 1984–2015, the main data sources are the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), from the IMF, and World 
Development Indicators (WDI), from the World Bank.  
4.2- The econometric model  
The aim of the present paper is to investigate the long run and 
short run relationship among government expenditure, stabilization 
fund, and macroeconomic and institutional variables for Algerian 
economy over the period of 1984-2015, by using the ARDL bounds 
testing approach developed by Pesaran and al.(2001) . Indeed, the 
ARDL bounds test approach has various advantages over the 
Johansen’s cointegration method. First, the ARDL bounds test is 
carried out even with mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables . Second, this 
technique is more appropriate for small and finite sample size as 
compared to the Engle-Granger (1987) and Johansen and Jeselius 
(1990) cointegration test (Pesaran and shin, 1999) . An additional 
benefit is that this technique overcomes the problems of serial 
correlation and endogeneity (Pesaran and shin ,1999)  . For these 
reasons, this study employs the ARDL bounds test approach to 
estimate equation (1).  
   The implementation of the ARDL approach estimation requires 
three steps. The first step is to determine the existence of a long run 
relationship between the concerned variables using the wald-
coefficient test or F-statistics, for testing the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration ( 0: 6543210  H ) against 
the alternative hypothesis of long run relationship (
0,0,0,0,0,0: 6543211  H ) . Then , 
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the calculated F-statistics is compared with the critical values 
proposed by Pesaran and al.(2001) . If the calculated F-statistic is 
higher than the upper bound critical value, then, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration is rejected, indicating that long run relationship 
exists .If the calculated F-statistic falls below the lower bound critical 
value, then the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. 
However, if the F-statistic lies within the lower and upper bounds, 
then the results are inclusive. The second step in the ARDL bounds 
analysis is to estimate the long run coefficients of the selected ARDL 
model. Finally, in the third step we estimate the short run coefficients 
by estimating an error correction model (ECM).  
4.3. Research results and discussions 
4.3. 1.Test results for unit root: 
According to Pesaran and al.(2001) the ARDL bounds test 
approach is valid for variables that are stationary either at level i.e. 
I(0)  or at first difference i.e. I(1) ,  or even fractionally integrated . 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the order of integration of the 
individual time series in order to ensure that none of the variables is 
integrated of order two i.e. I(2) or higher . ADF test, and Phillips-
Perron test statistics are employed. We run the test both in level and 
first differences. The results of unit root tests are reported in Table 1. 
In this study, these tests give the same results, namely that each of 
these series is I(1), that is they are integrated of order 1. 
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Table 2: Unit root tests 
ADF unit roots test 
Variable 
Level First difference 
Decision Intercept Intercept and trend Intercept Intercept and trend 






ICRGPOL     
SF*RGDP                         
0.068025    -2.9385 
0.93357      -2.9385 
0.00202     -3.0422 
-0.67056    -3.0449 
-2.1809     -3.0422 
-1.9559     -2.9385 
1.598640  -2.99187 
-1.7658     -3.5098 
-1.3493     -3.5098 
-1.7942     -3.5950 
-1.9697     -3.7128 
-2.3956     -3.5950 
-2.3560     -3.5098 
0.80396   - 3.61219 
-4.8564     -3.0422 
-4.0452     -3.0422 
-4.1299     -3.1472 
-3.2561     -3.0261 
-3.5523     -3.0888 
-3.4415     -3.0422 
-4.4353    -2.9918 
-6.8212     -3.5950 
-4.9186     -3.5950 
-4.2744     -3.5692 
-3.8330     -3.7280 
-4.1716     -3.6519 
-4.1182     -3.5609 








Phillips- Perron unit roots test 
Variable 
Level First difference 
Decision Intercept Intercept and trend Intercept Intercept and trend 








0.5150   -2.944 
1.3414     -2.9447 
-.53484     -2.845 
-.39790     -2.909 
-1.6928     -2.845 
-1.5763     -2.9447 
-1.3998    -2.9571 
-1.6979     -3.610 
-1.4957     -3.610 
-2.6634     -3.627 
-1.9533     -3.689 
-1.0699     -3.627 
-1.5390     -3.610 
-1.6862     -3.5577 
-3.6994     -2.845 
-5.3303     -2.845 
-5.7354     -2.944 
-3.4945     -2.9979 
-3.8848     -2.9447 
-4.7797     -2.8452 
-3.6378  -2.9604 
-3.8579    -3.627 
-6.0527     -3.627 
-6.4554     -3.557 
-3.8358     -3.583 
-4.1767     -3.5572 
-4.7957     -3.627 








Notes : The sample period runs from 1984 to 2016.CV  gives the 95 percent simulated critical values. 
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4.3. 2. Cointegration and long run analysis: 
Since none of the variables is integrated of order two, cointegration 
can be investigated using the ARDL bounds test approach .The 
bounds test is conducted to determine the existence of a long run 
relationship between variables in equation (1). Since we use annual 
data, we choose two as the maximal lag length in the bounds test. The 
results of the test are shown in table 3 below. 
Table 3:   Bounds test for cointegration analysis 










Computed F-statistic :    8.433425 
Note : The computed F-statistic is  8.433425 (significant at 1% significance level) . Critical 
values are cited from Pesaran et al.(2001) , Table B1 ,  Case II (intercept and no trend) .  
As the calculated F-statistics (8.433425) is greater than the upper 
bound at the one percent level (4.43) and five percent level (3.61), we 
conclude that there is  a long run relationship between the variables of 
our model. 
Once cointegrating relationship between the variables has been 
established, the estimate of the long run coefficients of the ARDL model 
can be obtained.  The optimal lag order of each variable in the ARDL 
system is selected on the basis of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The coefficients of the long run relationship between government 
expenditure and its determinant are reported in the table 4. 
Table 4: Estimated Long-run Coefficients using the ARDL Approach 
Regressor Coefficients Standard Error T – Ratio [prob.] 
RGDP 0.435947*** 0.041420 10.525052 0.0000 
SF*RGDP 0.000017*** 0.000003 5.458435 0.0001 
ICRGPOL -0.424637*** 0.049531 -8.573098 0.0000 
TOT 0.034939** 0.012854 2.718209 0.0176 
CREDIT 0.147915*** 0.018752 7.887950 0.0000 
GDEBT 0.030048*** 0.007490 4.011565 0.0015 
INPT 11.926035*** 2.219809 5.372551 0.0001 
Note: Dependent variable is REXPEND. We take government expenditure EXPEND and 
GDP in local currency and divide it by the CPI to get real data . The optimal lag is 
determined by AIC : AIC based ARDL(2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2). * significant at 10% level; ** 
significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  
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The results above also show that there is  a long run positive 
association between government expenditure and real GDP in 
Algeria, indicating that Algeria’s fiscal policy exhibits strong pro-
cyclicality, with an estimated coefficient 44.01  at 1% significant 
level. As expected, the finding of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy seems 
to be pronounced for Algeria, confirming the results of other related 
studies (Sturm and al., 2009; Abdih and al., 2010; Villafuerte and 
Lopez-Murphy, 2010; Erbil, 2011) which analyses the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy in oil producing countries.   Results in table 
4 show that the coefficient of the interaction term (SF*RGDP) is 
positive and highly statistically significant, indicating that fiscal policy 
is pro-cyclical in Algeria, even with the establishment of the oil 
stabilization fund. Thus, this positive association means that the 
establishment of stabilization fund in Algeria has not contributed in 
smoothing public spending. And we have seen previously, both 
government expenditures and the fund’s resources come from oil 
revenues, and a fall in the price of oil has a significant impact in 
reducing both public spending and the saving accumulated in the 
revenue regulation fund. 
Besides, the long run coefficient of terms of trade is positive and 
statistically significant as expected. In particular Algeria is a neat 
exporter of crude oil and gas, so increases in oil prices and hence 
terms of trade (in Algeria the main driver of terms of trade is the oil 
prices) tend to increase government expenditure.  
The results also show that there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between government expenditure and financial 
constrains variables, as the coefficients of both total government debt 
as a share of GDP (GDEBT) and private credit to GDP ratio (CREDIT) 
show a significantly positive effect on the pro-cyclical pattern, which 
is in line of what would be expected in theoretical terms.  
The results also show that the estimated coefficient on the variable 
political risk (ICRGPOL) is negative and statistically significant, 
implying that fiscal behavior is more pro-cyclical when the political 
and institutional variables ( proxied  by the political risk index ) are 
low  .These results are consistent with the theories that explain pro-
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cyclical behavior on fiscal policy due to the weak quality of 
institutions and corruption in government. 
4.3.3. Short-Run Dynamics:  
The short run coefficients obtained from the error correction 
representation (ECM) version of the ARDL model was also estimated 
and the results are reported in table 5. The results show that 
stabilization fund leads to a worsening of the pro-cyclicality of 
government expenditure in the short run. Besides, from the results, it 
is clear that the error correction term  )1( tecm  is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
The stability of the estimate model is examined using the 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMSQ) tests. As shown in figure 6, the graphs of the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ test lie within the 5% critical bounds which confirm 
that the estimated model is stable.   
Table 5:  Short-run Error Correction Model (ECM) for the selected ARDL  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(REXPEND(-1)) 0.632589*** 0.102754 6.156332 0.0000 
D(RGDP) 0.310056*** 0.062940 4.926207 0.0003 
D(TOT) -0.107958*** 0.011749 -9.188872 0.0000 
D(TOT(-1)) -0.030954** 0.010630 -2.911937 0.0121 
D(SF*RGDP) 0.000053*** 0.000008 6.748677 0.0000 
D(SF*RGDP(-1)) -0.000009       0.000008 -1.112853 0.2859 
D(ICRGPOL) -0.212755*** 0.059661 -3.566099 0.0034 
D(CREDIT) 0.205380*** 0.028794 7.132697 0.0000 
D(GDEBT) 0.041721*** 0.010331 4.038453 0.0014 
CointEq(-1) -0.388500*** 0.136687 -2.842260 0.0000 
Note: Dependent variable is EXPEND . We take government expenditure 
EXPEND and GDP in local currency and divide it by the CPI to get real data 
.The optimal lag is determined by AIC : AIC based ARDL(2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2). * 
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These results indicate that fiscal policy of Algeria exhibit high pro-
cyclicality, which is in line with most empirical literatures which 
analyse the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in developing and 
emerging countries as indicated by Kaminsky and al (2004), and other 
studies. Furthermore, the results show that even with the creation of 
an stabilization fund, government has failed to reduce the pro-cyclical 
bias of fiscal policy. 
CONCLUSION  
Oil exporting countries encounter major challenge due to the 
unpredictability and the volatility of oil prices and, as most of oil 
revenues belong to the government, price volatility can transmit to 
fiscal policy. To reduce fiscal spending instability and pro-cyclicality 
arising from the volatility of oil revenues as well as inducing the 
governments to save part of oil wealth for future generations , many 
oil rich countries have established the so called oil funds, Algeria is set 
to join other oil rich countries in establishing these stabilization funds 
to help stabilize government expenditure. 
The central question that we ask here is whether or not oil 
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Les Cahiers du Cread, vol. 34 -  n° 3 - 2018 
57 
and mitigate the business cycles in Algeria. Our empirical analysis 
shows that government spending is highly pro-cyclical in Algeria. 
In fact, despite the creation of an oil stabilization fund since 2000, 
government has failed to reduce dependence of the national budget 
on the oil revenue, and therefore, the pro-cyclical bias of government 
spending. Part of the reason behind this is the absence of a rule that 
limits the resources withdrawn annually from the revenue regulation 
fund to finance spending, the lack of limit on the fiscal balance, and 
weak performance of state institutions (IMF, 2013) .In Algeria 
institutions are not functioning well.  Thus, it is required to modernise 
the institutional framework, because countercyclical and effective 
fiscal policies require strong institutions and more transparency and 
accountability. 
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